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WHO PAYS FOR GUILT?: RECENT
FAULT-BASED DIVORCE REFORM
PROPOSALS, CULTURAL STEREOTYPES
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
It asks a little of us here.
It asks of us a certain height,
So when at times the mob is swayed
To carry praise or blame too far,
We may take something like a star
To stay our minds on and be staid.'
INTRODUCTION
Divorce law reform is a growing concern of state legislators and
legal scholars. 2 A number of states have considered various reforms
that reemphasize the role of fault in divorce proceedings.' Some of
these reform agendas include the creation of new and different kinds
of marriage contracts and criteria." These marriage criteria suggest that
spouses' marital behavior should influence divorce accessibility and
procedures.'
These fault-based proposals ultimately arc destructive and coun-
terproductive to divorcing individuals and families. Touted by propo-
nents as a means to decrease the devastating financial impact of di-
vorce upon women and children and to strengthen marriage,
fault-based divorce laws" ultimately rely on inconsistent and subjective
family court judges to define fault. Further, these definitions may be
influenced inappropriately by biological and cultural assumptions
about women and their proper social and familial roles.? By couching
the language of divorce reform in the language of marriage protection,
divorce reform proponents camouflage the political agenda surround-
I ROBERT FROST, SOMETHING LIKE A STAR (1949).
2 See Laura Gatland, Putting the Blame on No-Fault, 83-APR A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (1997).
5 See
See id.
See  id.
6 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a
No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. LJ. 2525, 2557 (1994); see also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHIL-
DREN IN AMERICA 70-109 (1985); Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change
Strategies, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 3 (1990).
7
 See Czapanskiy, supra note 6, at 3.
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ing divorce reform that attacks women's economic independence and
freedom within the family. Such an agenda attempts to pressure
women to accept certain economic and social roles because of cultur-
ally constructed gender differences based on biology.
The economic arguments informing fault-based divorce proposals
increase the privatization of social welfare by relieving the state of
the financial burden of supporting impoverished post-divorce fami-
lies. 9 Fault-based divorce laws link economic settlements to culturally-
defined and shifting definitions of personal responsibility and moral
behavior, thus relieving the state of any responsibility to care for its
economically disadvantaged citizens—often divorced women and their
children .9 Such laws result in the economic privatization of family
welfare and relieve the state of propagating the necessary economic
reforms that will attend to the needs of divorcing parties. 1 ° Neverthe-
less, this Note does not propose that divorce reform is unnecessary,
rather that economic, not moral, reform of divorce law is necessary to
eliminate the disparate economic consequences of divorce."
Part I outlines the history and development of no-fault divorce
laws over the last four decades. Part II discusses the detrimental eco-
nomic and cultural consequences of current no-fault divorce laws. Part
III reviews recent arguments supporting and enabling fault-based di-
vorce laws. Part IV illustrates the negative consequences when such
fault-based divorce laws are premised upon moral and cultural judg-
ments. Part V offers an alternative economic approach to divorce
reform by addressing economic realities and inequalities facing men
and women upon divorce. Finally, Part VI offers new ways of reconcep-
tualizing marriage so as to lead to greater economic equality in per-
sonal and familial relationships.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE LAW
After World War II, divorce became less stigmatized and thus,
became more common." The reasons for the growing social and cul-
tural acceptance of divorce are difficult to identify with specificity."
B See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES
AND EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 105 (1987) thereinafter GLENDON, ABORTION & DIVORCE].
9 See id
I° See Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms:
Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 195-97
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Derma 1-1111 Kay eds., 1990).
I I See WEITZMAN, supra note 6.
12 See Laura Bradford, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-Fault
Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611 (1997).
' 3 See id at 611-12.
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Certainly, the advent of the sexual revolution and women's liberation
movements created a climate where the traditional notion of the indi-
visibility of marriage was tested." Additionally, developing attitudes
about the family as a relationship of independent individuals chal-
lenged the traditional notion of the family as an interdependent unit."
Despite these cultural and social developments, traditional fault
grounds, such as adultery, abandonment, desertion and physical or
mental cruelty, were the only grounds for divorce in most states prior
to 1968. 16 Consequently, during the 1950s and 1960s, a gap developed
between the growing cultural arid social acceptance of divorce and the
strict judicial control of divorce proceedings governed by concepts of
fault and blame."
The results of this gap were often collusion by divorcing couples
and migratory divorce."' Collusion, which also served as an affirmative
defense in fault regimes, was the perjurious involvement of both hus-
band and wife in manufacturing grounds for divorce.' 9 Usually those
manufactured grounds were adultery or the hard-to-disprove mental
cruelty." Migratory divorce consisted of acquiring residency briefly in
a "divorce-mill" state and then receiving a divorce after establishing
proper jurisdiction."
The desire to avoid collusion and migratory divorce spurred the
call for divorce reform. 22 In the 1960s, lawyers drafted original no-fault
divorce proposals to maintain judicial integrity in the face of abuse of
the judicial apparatus by divorcing parties." Significantly, the drafters
were not seeking the achievement of gender equality or neutrality
through their reform agendas." In addition, original no-fault divorce
proposals did not contemplate quick and easy divorce; instead they
14 Evidence of this trend is most apparent in the popular press. A review of any media outlet
over the past 30 years will evince this trend.
15 See Bradford, supra note 12, at 613.
Ili See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decision Making About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV.
9, 15 & n.14 (1990); see also HOMER II. CLARK, JR., THE LAW Or DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 497-521 (2d cd. 1988).
17 See Bradford, supra note 12, at 611-13, 614.
Ill See id. at 611; Scott, ,supra note 16, at 15-16.
19 See Scott, supra. note 16, at 15-16 & n.17.
" See id.; see also Professor Sanford N. Katz, Lecture in Family Law Class at Boston College
Law School (Oct. 12, 1997).
21 See CLARK, supra note 16, at 109. Clark argues that migratory divorces were common only
among the wealthy who could afford an extended trip to a jurisdiction that granted quick
divorces. See id.
22 See Scott, supra note 16, at 17 & ti.17.
23 See id. at 17; see also Bradford, supra note 12, at 613-14.
24 See 1-1crina Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its
Aftermath, 56 U. C1N. L. REV. 1, 26 (1987).
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encouraged a neutral assessment of a marriage's viability by a third
party so as to avoid the reliance on the often undignified farce of
collusion.25
Current no-fault divorce law provides few judicial barriers to di-
vorce and instead allows the parties involved to assess the viability of
the marriage. 26 Judges do not contest the viability of a marriage. 27
Elizabeth Scott, an advocate of fault-based divorce reform, attributes
the current lack of legal barriers to divorce to the cultural rise of
individual liberty within the family and the willingness of courts to
recognize the autonomy of parties within the family, at the expense of
the integrity of the family itself. 28 Indeed, she notes with disapproval
that courts today have received and acted on the message that "no
barrier should seriously hinder a decision at any time by either party
that the marriage should end."29 Jana Singer, arguing against fault-
based divorce, nevertheless echoes Scott's observation: the "shift from
family privacy to decisional autonomy is . . . consistent with the rapid
shift from the fault-based to consensual divorce and ultimately to
divorce at the option of either spouse?" Thus, no-fault divorce law has
developed as a procedure without significant barriers enacted by the
state or predicated on third party involvement. Such accessibility is the
aspect of no-fault divorce that comes under attack by divorce law
reform advocates.
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to assume that fault-based
divorce options no longer exist in the marriage dissolution process. 3 '
Most states retained fault statutes when legislatures added no-fault
statutes, and either procedure may be used to obtain a divorce."
Moreover, the moral behavior of the parties may influence judges who
adhere to inappropriate cultural definitions of proper gender behav-
ior."
More explicitly, a spouse's improper dissipation of assets during
the marriage—such as spending substantial marital funds on an extra-
marital lover or gambling—may be a factor a judge considers under
25 See Scott, supra note 16, at 17.
26 See id. at 17-19.
27 See id.
2H See id. at 19-21.
29 Id. at 21.
"Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REtr. 1443, 1512.
31 See SANFORD N. KATZ, FRANCES OLSEN & WALTER 0. WEYRAUCIL CASES AND MATERIALS
ON FAMILY LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND CHANCING HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 626 (1994).
32 See Woodhouse, supra note 6, at 2534 int.33-36,
" See id. at 2557.
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some equitable distribution statutes." For instance, a spouse's mental
cruelty might necessitate psychiatric care for the other spouse which
would be paid for by the inflicting spouse as part of an alimony
package.'5 Therefore, although fault grounds no longer exist as the
exclusive means to dissolve a marriage, they continue to exist as an
alternative divorce procedure in most states.
II. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE LAW
In addition to the increased "hands-off" attitude of the judiciary
toward divorce, no-fault divorce has had unforeseen economic conse-
quences.36 The gender-neutral language of no-fault divorce laws, equi-
table property division schemes and equality-based support awards did
not translate into equal results for men and women."
Lenore J. Weitzman's 1985 groundbreaking study of the economic
impact of no-fault divorce laws on women and children in California,
The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Consequences for Women and
Children in America, reveals troublesome consequences for divorcing
women and their children." For many reasons, including the initial
failure of no-fault divorce legislation to include intangible assets of a
marriage—such as pensions, degrees, professional licenses, future
earning potential and business goodwill—as property equally divisible
upon divorce and the failure to recognize homemaking and childrear-
ing as labor investments, judges and "the courts are not ... dividing
property equally or equitably." q' Additionally, ostensible attempts at
gender neutrality caused women to be denied alimony payments, in
the expectation that they would support themselves. Consequently,
Weitzman found that divorced women and their children "experience
a seventy-three percent decline in their standard of living in the first
year after divorce, Their former husbands, in contrast, experience a
forty-two percent rise in their standard of living."'"
34 See KATZ ET AL., supra note 31, at 626.
33 See id.
36 See WErrzmArq, supra note 6.
37 See id. at 70-109; see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation
of Legal Rules for Distribution of Property at Divorce, in AT THE BOUNDARIES Or LAW; FEMINISM
AND LEGAL THEORY 277 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds„ 1991).
38 WErr7mAx, supra note 6, at ix-XViii.
30 Id. at xiii.
40 Id. But see Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130,131-32 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Hernia Hill Kay eds., 1990).
Sugarman argues that Weitztzian interpreted her data improperly. See id. lie contends that women
in California were no worse off economically after the implementation of no-fault divorce than
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In comparison, under a traditional fault regime, an "innocent"
wife generally could expect economic support in the form of alimony
after divorce.''' Alimony traditionally was conceived as "a lifetime enti-
tlement based on a husband's duty to support his wife." 42 Its theoretical
foundation thus relied on gender-based assumptions about women's
and men's proper marital and work roles." Implicitly, the husband's
duty as breadwinner was predicated on his wife's role as homemaker
and childrearer. Legal scholar Martha Fineman conceptualizes ali-
mony in this context as based on need." A wife, both before and after
divorce, depends on her husband for financial support in the need
paradigm because she brings no economic value to the marriage:16
Fineman suggests that need-based alimony is disparaged in divorce due
to the perception of women as formally equal to men. 46
After the advent of no-fault legislation and the implementation of
equitable distribution statutes, the rationale behind alimony changed
to a temporary support measure to rehabilitate and re-educate women
for self-sufficiency in the labor market.° Fineman conceptualizes this
theory, purportedly based on women's equality to men, as contribu-
tion-based.46 A contribution-based theory posits that women and men
contribute equal value to a marriage and thus should be independent
of each other after divorce. This theory of alimony, however, did not
address the disparities in earning potential between men and women
caused by women's significantly lower salaries, less training and educa-
tion compared to their male counterparts." Furthermore, judges mak-
ing such awards did not take into account the problems encountered
by long-term homemakers who faced age and gender discrimination
before, but concedes that divorced women and their children generally occupy a poor position
under either regime. See id. at 130.
4 I See WErrzmAN, supra note 6, at 8-9, 27-29. But see Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender
Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1106-07 (1989) [hereinafter Singer, Divorce Reform]. Singer chal-
lenges this alimony myth and notes that alimony awards were not routinely awarded under the
fault regime. See id.
42 Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 41, at 1106.
43 See id.
44 See Fineman, supra note 37, at 271.
45 See id.
4 " See id.
47 See Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 41, at 1106.
48 See Fineman, supra note 37, at 269.
48 See MARTHA ALBERTSON F1NEMAN, ILLUSIONS OF EQUALITY: TIIE RHETORIC AND REALITY
OF DIVORCE REFORM 37, 197-99 nn.3-7 (1991). Statistics and studies that consider women's role
in the marketplace after marriage and divorce are most often considering mother's roles in the
market. Divorced women without children share fewer of the problems of lower wages, less
training, less education and less savings than divorced women with children. See id,
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in the labor tnarket." These women arc still in a state of need or
dependency that temporary alimony fails to address." Additionally,
Weitzman's study reported that five out of six divorced women were
not awarded alimony after California's no-fault laws were enacted. 52
This is not surprising, considering that alimony awards under the
fault regime were generally given to middle-class or upper-middle-class
women only, which comprise a small minority of divorce cases.53
The no-fault and equitable distribution statutes as systems of equal
treatment via gender-neutral laws have produced severely unequal
results and have contributed to the poverty facing many single moth-
ers." Women who are the primary caregivers of small children after
divorce (mothers remain the primary custodial parent in about ninety
percent of divorce cases) must contend with gender-neutral divorce
laws that do not adequately consider their ongoing contributions as
primary caregivers even when they work outside the home. Combined
with judicial reluctance to force men—especially those with second
families—to share income with their ex-spouses who arc primary care-
givers, temporary alimony results in the continuing impoverishment of
women and children."
Weitzman focused on California, a community property state,
where property is divided equally upon divorce. Since she collected
her data, there have been substantial changes in divorce law in both
common law and community property states. 56 These changes include
an increase in equitable distribution statutes and redefinitions of what
is considered property. 57 New property analyses, however, have contin-
ued to rely on judicial discretion and have met with mixed results."
Martha Fineman noted that one reason for the lack of success of
equitable distribution statutes in providing adequate support for di-
vorced women is the conceptual schism created by those equitable
distribution factors addressing need and those addressing contribu-
tion." Need-based factors perpetuate assumptions about the depend-
'I° See W Erum AN „supra note 6, at 34-35.
' 1 See Fineman, supra note 37, at 270.
52 See WEITZMAN, supra note 6, at 33,
55 See id.
54
 See id.
55 See id. at xiii, 35; see also Fineman, supra note 37, at 270-71.
56 See Hernia Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS 6,12 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Hernia Hill Kay eds,, 1990) [hereinafter Kay,
Beyond No-Fault].
57 See id. at 12-13.
58 See id.
9 See Fineman, supra note 37, at 269-78.
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ency of women and contribution-based factors may inappropriately
presuppose equality between men and women in marriage and the
workplace. 6° The inability to assert these two concepts—need and con-
tribution—simultaneously causes divorce settlements to reflect one or
the other without accounting for women's roles which encompass both
concepts, e.g., the woman who works outside the home and is also the
primary caretaker of children. 6 ' Thus, equitable distribution statutes
fail to respond to the continuing impoverishment of divorced women
and their children.
Another response to the availability of no-fault divorce is the
misperception perpetuated by some scholars and the popular media
that the rise in the divorce rate since 1970—almost fifty percent of
marriages arc expected to end in divorce—results from easier access
to divorce due to the enactment of no-fault statutes. 62 This causal link
has never been substantiated and relies on circumstantial cultural
evidence.° Nonetheless, the causal link is accepted popularly and often
leads to the inappropriate conclusion that societal ills, such as juvenile
delinquency, result from divorced or "broken" families.€4 The deterio-
ration of the institution of the family through divorce, rather than
larger economic or political forces, is perceived as leading directly to
social upheavals. 65 Such misconceptions serve to link large-scale social
and economic problems to individual familial responsibility via notions
of fault, rather than attributing such problems to larger political, social
or economic forces.° Again, the state is exonerated from addressing
costly societal problems if the fault of those problems can be attributed
to personal moral choices within and by nuclear families.
60
 See id.
61 See id. at 272.
62 See CLARK, supra note 16, at 514; see also WErrnanst, supra note 6, at ix; Ashton Applewhite,
Q: Would Louisiana's 'Covenant Marriage' Be a Good Idea for America?, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1997,
at 25 ("IT The great misconception is that divorce laws change people's behavior."); Louisiana
OKs Stricter Marriage Contracts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 24, 1997, at 180 ("[Nf o-fault
divorce laws have helped lead to escalating divorce rates and the disintegration of families.").
63 See CLARK, supra note 16, at 514.
61 See Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 15, 1997) ("[T]he issue of teenage crime,
violence, delinquency, teenage pregnancy, all of that is tracking back to broken homes.").
65 See id; see also GLENDON, AssowrioN & DivoitcE, supra note 8, at 107-08.
66 See Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 15, 1997); see also GLENDON, ABORTION &
DIVORCE, supra note 8, at 107-08.
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III. RECENT ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF FAULT-BASED DIVORCE LAW
A. Ideological and Cultural Arguments Favoring Fault-Based Divorce
Even though fault grounds arc available today, there have been
increased movements across the country by various groups to evaluate
the perceived failures of no-fault divorce laws in the name of family
values.° Many of these movements urge a reconsideration of the ef-
ficacy, necessity and moral value of no-fault divorce laws. 68 In the past
five years, there have been several legislative efforts in many states to
repeal or modify no-fault statutes, 69 Other state legislators have intro-
duced bills calling for two-tiered marriage and divorce criteria." These
proposals share a fundamental goal—as Lester Wallace, founder of
American Attorneys for Tougher Divorce Laws, suggests—"basically to
preserve the family unit."71
Recently, the Louisiana legislature introduced fault grounds into
divorce proceedings under the guise of marriage strengthening by
authorizing a marriage dissolvable only on fault grounds. 72 On July 15,
1997, Governor Mike Foster of Louisiana signed into law the Covenant
Marriage Act ("the Act")." Representative Tony Perkins (R-Baton
Rouge), a Christian Promise-Keeper, introduced the Act into the Lou-
isiana legislature." Perkins claims that the Act's goal is "not about
eliminating divorce . . The goal is to strengthen marriage."'" Only
if a couple chooses to contract a covenant marriage rather than a
traditional marriage does the Act take effect." The Act does not disturb
existing, traditional marriage entry requirements in Louisiana; further-
more, divorce is still available in a traditional marriage under fault and
no-fault statutes.77
Strict pre-marital and post-marital criteria comprise the Act. 78
Once a couple, defined in the Act as "one male and one female,"
67 See Gatland, supra note 2, at 52.
68 See id.
69 See id.
7° See id.
71 Id.
72 See LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 272-275 (West Supp. 1998).
SeeD.R. 1380, 1997 Reg. Sess. (La, 1997).
71 See Christopher Caldwell, The Arc of the Covenant Marriage, WEEKLY STANDARD, Sept. 29,
1997, at 25. The Promise Keepers is a MOWS religious organization rooted in fundamentalist
Christian philosophy.
75 Id.
76 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 272B.
" See Major Cox, Alabamians Need Choice of Marriages, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Sept. 3,
1997, at 6A.
78 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 272, 279,
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declare their intent to contract a covenant marriage on their marriage
license application, they must fulfill three pre-marital criteria in addi-
tion to Louisiana's traditional criteria. 79 These three requirements arc:
(1) they must execute a declaration of intention that requires full
disclosure of anything "which could adversely affect the decision to
enter into this marriage," (2) they must receive premarital counseling
from a religious leader or certified counselor and (3) they must prom-
ise to seek counseling when experiencing marital troubles."
The stricter criteria for entering a covenant marriage mirror the
stricter criteria for exiting such a marriage 81
 Grounds for dissolution
of a covenant marriage include adultery, committing a felony that
results in a sentence of death or imprisonment at hard labor, abandon-
ment of the marital domicile, physical or sexual abuse of the spouse
seeking the divorce or a child of either spouse, living apart for one
year with judgment of separation from bed and board (or eighteen
months if there is a minor child of the marriage) or separation of two
years." Separation from bed and board is permitted under the statute
on the same grounds as a divorce."
Louisiana is not alone in its attempts to "strengthen marriage" via
marriage and divorce reform legislation. 84 At least twelve other states
are considering or have considered so-called marriage strengthening
options including re-introducing fault grounds in certain circum-
stances, requiring pre-marital counseling, eliminating no-fault statutes
and extending pre-marital waiting periods."
B. Economic Arguments: Fault as Leverage
Some critics argue for the use of fault-based divorce as a means
for economically disadvantaged spouses, generally wives, to leverage
greater economic support from their at-fault spouses." The argument
is that this leverage would give women access to better financial settle-
ments." Leverage can be manifested in three ways. First, when fault
grounds exist, wives may demand a fair economic settlement by threat-
79 See id. §§ 272A, 273A(2) (a).
"See id. § 273A(2) (a).
81 See id. § 307.
82 See id. "Separation from bed and board" is a term of art meaning separation. See GILBERT
LAW DICTIONARY 162 (1994).
83 See LA. Il•v. STAT. ANN. § 307.
84 See Bradford, supra note 12, at 618 tt.91; Gatland, supra note 2, at 52.
85 See Bradford, supra note 12, at 618 n.91. Bradford notes the similarities between the criteria
used to permit entry into marriage and the criteria used to impede access to abortion. See id. at
620-21; see also Catland, supra note 2, at 52.
at See WEITzmAsi, supra note 7, at 8-9,27-29.
67 See id.
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cuing their husbands with a public trial airing the fault grounds.
Second, faultless women may receive a greater economic share of the
property and significant spousal support by the court as the "innocent"
and thus injured party if the threat of trial is realized." Third, women
whose husbands want a divorce but have not provided fault grounds
have the power to refuse the divorce or to acquiesce and agree to col-
lude in creating false fault grounds, such as mental cruelty or adul-
tery." Women then can leverage that power into greater property and
support agreements."
C. Critique of Privacy Doctrine Argument
Another argument supporting fault-based divorce stems from a
critique of the individual rights or privacy doctrine. 9 ' During the 1960s
and 1970s, as no-fault divorce reform legislation spread throughout the
country, the United States Supreme Court developed a jurisprudence
of individual rights based on a doctrine of privacy. 92 This jurisprudence
of individual rights and privacy arose from cases involving the family
and intimate relationships." In 1965, the Supreme Court in Griswold
v. Connecticut held that married couples have the right to obtain and
use contraception. 9^ The Griswold Court identified marriage and mari-
tal intimacy as constituting "a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights."99
 justice Goldberg's concurring opinion, however, emphasized
not only the "right of marital privacy" but also the "personal liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution" that allows individuals within a mar-
riage to make choices about family planning. 96
In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, held that single
people also had the right under the Equal Protection Clause to obtain
and use birth control. 97 The Court noted that " [i] f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
w See id. But see Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 41, at 1107. Singer contends that
Weitzman's argument may rely on nostalgic notions of women's bargaining power and position
prior to no-fault divorce. See id.
"Although the critics do not endorse collusion specifically, the possibility exists as it did in
pre-no-fault days.
95 See WEITZMAN, supra note 7, at 8-9,27-29,
91 See Scott, supra note 16, at 10-11.
92 See Kay, Beyond No-Fault, supra note 56; see also Roc v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
95 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 116; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 440; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
94 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
55 Id. at 486.
95 /d. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
97 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 440,454-55.
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fundamentally affecting a person . . ." as whether to bear children."
Both the Eisenstadt and Griswold decisions emphasized the importance
of the individual in making family-related decisions."
Finally, in 1973, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that a
Texas abortion statute criminalizing non-therapeutic abortions was un-
constitutional.w° The Court reasoned that women have certain individ-
ual privacy rights that may be expressed by terminating a pregnancy.m
These three cases reflect both the rise of a privacy doctrine that pro-
tects individual rights within the family against unjustified state intru-
sion and a jurisprudence of decisional autonomy that extends to the
individual within a marriage. 102
This privacy doctrine, which seems to be reflected in contempo-
rary divorce legislation, critics argue, wrongfully privileges the self over
the family or community unit.'" As Elizabeth Scott remarks, "[m]ar-
riage is no longer a relationship reinforced by religious, moral, and
legal restraints. Indeed, contemporary marriage has been aptly de-
scribed as a `non-binding commitment' . . . that survives only as long
as each spouse's needs arc met." 1)4 Critics argue that privileging indi-
vidual autonomy within a family unit threatens the stability of the
family unit as the primary site of childrearing. 1115 The argument against
a family law doctrine shaped or influenced by the cultural or political
context of individual rights prioritizes nuclear families as interdepend-
ent social units and identifies childrearing as the reason for privileging
such an arrangement.'" Proponents of this interdependent approach
to family law identify stricter fault-divorce criteria as a means to keep
families together by counteracting the seemingly selfish impetus of the
individual for freedom within relationships. 107
98 1d. at 453.
M See id. at 453; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497.
102 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
101 See id, at 152-53.
1 °2 See id. at 116; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
153 See Scott, supra note 16, at 10-12.
Hi" Id. at 10.
1 °5
 See id. at 11.
IN See GLENDON, ABORTION & DIVORCE, supra note 8, at 108-10.
1 °7 0ne critic of the primacy of individual rights, Mary Ann Glendon, identifies no-fault
divorce as merely a symptom of 'family break-down" and not its cause. See MARY ANN GLENDON,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 193 (1989) [hereinafter GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION]; see
also Scott, supra note 16, at 12-13,14. But see Martha Miaow, Consider the Consequences: Review
of Lenore Weitzman's The Divorce Revolution, in FAMILY MATTERS: READINGS ON FAMILY LIVES
AND THE LAW 332 (Martha Miuow ed., 1993).
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D. A Fault-Regarding Proposal
Another argument favoring fault in divorce law, developed by
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, is a "fault-regarding" regime. 1 °8 A fault-
regarding regime would permit spouses to include personal behavior
and notions of blame as factors considered in the story of a marriage
and divorce. 109 In such a regime, fault would be one factor among many
to consider when making financial arrangements upon divorce.' 1 U The
moral story of the marriage would equal other more typical equitable
distribution factors.'" A fault-regarding regime, Woodhouse states,
would account for women's generally suppressed narratives of non-eco-
nomic emotional and psychological harms and allow them to be heard
legally in court."'
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF FAULT-BASED DIVORCE ARGUMENTS
The four examples of "pro-fault" divorce arguments previously
noted—Woodhouse's fault-regarding regime, the Louisiana statute,
the individual rights critique and the economic leverage argument—
have potentially detrimental economic and cultural consequences. By
basing statutory law on concepts of moral behavior and
leaving the interpretation of those statutes to individual judges, legis-
lators threaten to take us back in time.'" Women's and men's post-di-
vorce circumstances would continue to be shaped by judicial discretion
rather than more objective, external guidelines. 'Further, family law
cases have little opportunity for appellate review.'" Furthermore,
women's and men's moral behavior could be judged by wildly diver-
gent standards in different courtrooms, creating great opportunity for
uneven and unfair application of the law where the perception of gcn-
134 See Woodhouse, supra note 6, at 2533.
1 °9 See id. at 2547.
II° See id.
111 See id. at 2567. Common factors for deciding alimony or spousal support include the
following: length of marriage, conduct during marriage, age, health, station, occupation, source
of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, needs and opportunity for future
acquisition of property. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (1996). Woodhouse goes further,
however, and argues for a:consideration of fault as an explicit factor in marriage dissolution. See
Woodhouse, supra note 6, at 2567, She proposes a new cause of action known as a marital tort
or brcach of spousal trust. See id. Such a tort would be actionable upon "physical, emotional, and
economic injuries flowing from a spouse's misconduct." Id.
" 2 See id.
" 3 See LA. REV, STAT. ANN. §§ 272-275, 307-309 (West Stipp. 1998); Cadand, supra note 2,
at 52.
14 See KA•z ET AL, supra note 31, at 626.
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der roles arc based on culturally constructed differences."' These
proposals, moreover, discussed in terms of family values and marriage
strengthening, are based on unquestioned assumptions about the
value of the legal and moral supremacy of the traditional nuclear
family as well as the constitution and proper roles of members of such
a family. 116 Lastly, these proposals further lead to the inappropriate
privatization of social welfare.
Although these critics may mention the gender implications of
fault-based divorce regimes, they ultimately disregard gender implica-
tions in their final proposals." 7 More precisely, these fault-based re-
forms, although perhaps equitable in theory, are less equitable when
applied practically in a system where women are at an economic dis-
advantage vis-à-vis men. 118 By framing their discussions of divorce re-
form in moral and cultural terms, these critics attempt to bring the
legal apparatus in line with a body politic that ostensibly favors vaguely
defined family values."' Yet, the unequal economic foundations of
both fault and no-fault divorce regimes remain unexplored and ulti-
mately unaddressed in these proposals, which rely on cultural construc-
tion of gender based on biological stereotype. 120
For example, the Louisiana Covenant Marriage Act defines mar-
riage as "a covenant between a man and a woman who agree to live
together as husband and wife for so long as they both may live."'" The
language of the Act creates an ontological gap between a person's body
and his or her role as spouse.' 22 We are left with legally enacted cultural
stereotypes that reduce "wife" and "husband" to the performance of
their genders based on behavior that the Act does not spell out.'"
The Act's assumptions about gender differences perpetuate as-
sumptions about gender's relation to work roles.'" The Act's sponsor,
115 See Czapanskiy, supra note 6.
" 6 See LA. Raw. STAT. ANN, §§ 272-275, 307-309; GLENDON, ABORTION & DivoacE, supra
note 8, at 108; Gatland, supra note 2, at 52; Martha Heller, Should Breaking-Up Be Harder to Do?:
The Ramifications a Return to Fault-Based Divorce Would Have Upon Domestic Violence, 4 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 263, 264 (1996); Scott, supra note 16, at 9.
" 7 See Scott., supra note 16; Woodhouse, supra note 6.
118 See Fineman, supra note 37, at 36-37.
"9 See Scott, supra note 16, at 12, 13; see also GLENDON, ABORTION & Divoact:, supra note 8,
at 107-08; Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 15, 1997).
12° See Gatland, supra note 2; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 273-275, 305-307; Scott, supra
note 16.
121 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273A( I).
122
 See id.
123 See id. §§ 272-275;	 BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS
OF "SEX" 1-23 (1993).
129 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273A(1); Heller, supra note 116, at 266.
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Tony Perkins, identified abandoned full-time homemakers in financial
ruin as most in need of the Act's protection. 125 But once a couple has
fulfilled the requirements for divorce, the language of the Act does not
provide for a process of financial dissolution favoring an "innocent"
spouse.' 26 A divorced housewife may still face financial upheaval. Fur-
thermore, Perkins suggests that the ex-wife most likely to win a sub-
stantial settlement from a sympathetic court due to her spouse's guilt
will be the full-time homemaker. The cultural assumptions about
women most in need, most wronged or most deserving will color the
financial settlement and may serve to harm women who arc apparently
less wronged, less victimized or less in need. The financial outcome
may favor women who work as homemakers over women who work
outside the home.' 27
A significant problem attending the Act, as well as the other
proposals, is the role of judicial discretion.'" Judicial discretion raises
problems when fault is an explicit part of the calculus of the economic
settlement.' 2" Under the Act, judges would decide the financial penal-
ties attending specific fault transgressions. Indeed, judges—and not
the parties—would be in the position to decide exactly what constitutes
adultery or mental cruelty by determining the costs of such behavior.'"
As Katharine T. Bartlett notes, relying on fault while sex and
gender assumptions are in force can be dangerous because a judge's
potentially sexist notions of proper marital behavior could influence a
settlement decision unfairly.'"' Yet, this danger is not always apparent
to divorce reform advocates.'" Barbara Woodhouse analogizes such
judicial decisionmaking to judicial assessments of business goodwill,
pain and suffering in tort actions and good faith in contract actions.'"
Woodhouse chooses not to recognize how gender plays a role in as-
sessing fault in divorce actions—suits which by their nature distinguish
parties by gender. 13 ^
125 See Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 15, 1997),
126 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 307-309,
127 See Today Shaw (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 15, 1997).
128 See Kay, Beyond No-Fault, supra note 56, at 9, 12-13; Rhode & Minow, supra note 10, at
202.
126 See Kay, Beyond No-Fault, supra note 56, at 9, 12-13; Rhode & Minow, supra note 10, at
202.
1 " See Kay, Beyond No-Fault, supra note 56, at 9, 12-13; Rhode & Minow, supra note 10, at
202.
IS] See Viborlhousc, supra note 6, at 2559.
132 See id. at 2560.
1311 See id.
134 See id. at 2557. Women's unequal earning power, lack of federal domestic work protection,
second shift work assignments in the home after working a full day outside the home and the
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The individual rights critique also has problematic gender impli-
cations which shift the focus of reform from economic to cultural
considerations.'" Seeking self-fulfillment and independence as com-
pared with self-sacrifice and interdependence was an option tradition-
ally available to men only."' Men, interacting in a public economic
culture, had the freedom to seek these qualities and claim them as
ideals.' 37
 Women, on the other hand, in their traditional roles as care-
givers and mothers, were not expected to desire those qualities or to
possess them.' 38
 Some critics identified women's pursuit of these quali-
ties as a cause of marital instability; other critics do not identify this
gender phenomenon explicitly.'" Rather, they criticize the rise in these
qualities as a cause of social instability over the last thirty years gener-
ally, thus implicitly condemning those seeking such self-fulfillment or
independence in greater numbers."' Undoubtedly, the quality of indi-
vidual self-fulfillment might be an inadequate family model for both
men and women, but it came under sustained critique as a result of
women's seeking it.' 91 This criticism of women's demands for political
and economic power threatens to lead to a legal backlash against
women's increasing empowerment. This legal backlash is evinced by
the Louisiana Act's tacit favoring of full-time homemakers. 192
Furthermore, divorce reformers' attempts to counteract the di-
vorce "crisis" by strengthening marriage rely on the unspoken, unchal-
lenged assumption that marriage should be a legally and economically
privileged relationship. 14 ' Rarely addressed is the reason why marriage
is privileged as the site of childrearing and as an economic unit. 144
Marriage and the patriarchal nuclear family order the capitalist econ-
ontological leaps between the idea of a wife and her gender attest to the power differential
inherent to institutionalized gender relations such as marriage. See id.
135 See Minow, supra note 107, at 333.
156 See Peter D. Kramer, Divorce and Our National Values, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at A23.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See Ruth Sidel, But Where Are the Men, in FAMILY MATTERS: READINGS ON FAMILY L/VES
AND TILE Low 315 (Martha Minow ed., 1993); Christina Del Valle, Covenant Marriage: The New
Louisiana Law That Makes the Ties That Bind Even Tighter: a Boost for Covenant Marriage,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 23, 1997, at B17,
14° See Sidel, supra note 139, at 315; Del Valle, supra note 139, at 1117.
141 See GLENDON, ABORTION & DIVORCE, supra note 8, at 108; Scott, supra note 16, at 21.
Women choose to end marriages twice as often as men do. See Applewhite, supra note 62. This
fact emphasizes how attacks on broken (i.e. divorced) families can be read as attacks on women's
independence.
142
 Seel...A. REV. STAT, ANN. §§ 273-275, 307-309; Dcl Valle, supra note 139, at B17; Gatland,
supra note 2, at 52.
143 See Scott, supra note 16, at 12-13.
144 See id.
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omy by streamlining production based on gender; men produce in the
public market and women serve as "nurture workers" or caretakers of
the husband and children even when they work outside the home." 5
Such a marriage system contributes to the continued instability of
women's position as a "worker" in the family because much of her work
is unpaid. A wife may be forced to rely on her husband's employment
for her own insurance, benefits, pension or retirement, and she is not
protected by fair labor statutes that regulate employment hours or pay
rates."5 Reformers such as Woodhouse identify a "family centric" envi-
ronment as "a goal of family law" without explaining why this should
be the goal or why "family" need have only one definition.' 17
One result of a nuclear family-centric legal goal is the reduction
of the state's need to support nurture workers economically, which
leaves divorced women economically vulnerable.'" The individual nu-
clear family as an economic unit constitutes a form of private welfare
that relieves the state of that duty." 9 Ultimately, these fault-based re-
forms linking damage awards to marital behavior insist on shifting the
focus away from state involvement to individual moral behavionm
Moreover, most fault-based divorce reform arguments do not con-
sider public assistance as part of the economic equation in a divorce."'
Ultimately, the private market—with its fundamental inequalities—will
continue to add to the poverty of many women and especially children
who live with their mothers after divorce. 152 Fault-based reforms would
continue the economic effect of the privatization of family law gener-
ally and of the social welfare of children of divorced parents particu-
larly.'" Such a system relieves the state of the duty to care for children
145 See Rhode & Minow, supra note 10, at 192-94; see also Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the
Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under
No-Fault, 60 U. L. REV. 67, 69 n.3, 72 n.l 1 (1993) (majority of married women retain primary
care of home and child raising; married working women work jobs offering flexible hours rather
than higher wages).
146 See Woodhouse, supra note 6, at 2551. The Fair Labor Standards Act enforces wage and
hour standards protecting employees in the workplace setting outside of the home, and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 enforces standards protecting workers employed outside their
homes from workplace discrimination based on race or gender. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (I) (1994).
147 See Woodhouse, supra note 6, at 2555-6.
146 See Rhode & Mitiow, supra note 10, at 197.
lig See id. at 196.
1511 See LA. REA/. STAT. ANN, §§ 272-275, 307-309,
151 See id.; Scott, supra note 16; Woodhouse, supra note 6.
152 See Starnes, supra 'note. 145.
155 See Woodhouse, supra note 6, at 2562-63.
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whose economic support may be reduced drastically upon a divorce,
leaving many children and their mothers in poverty.'"
Reintroduction of fault-based reforms in lieu of economic reforms
will not protect the full-time or part-time nurture worker—the mother
who stays at home to raise her children.' 55 For example, if a home-
maker is at fault in a fault-based divorce regime, she may face severe
economic loss upon divorce.' 56 Such a worker and her children would
suffer greater poverty than an "innocent" wife because she may receive
little or no spousal support.' 57 Additionally, even if she is trained and
educated for the labor market, a woman still earns significantly less
than her male counterpart.' 58 Social and economic factors such as these
affect a divorced mother and her children in significant ways and are
not addressed in fault-based reforms.' 59
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO DIVORCE REFORM
The results of divorce on many women and their children are
economically detrimental.' 6° Although women's valid narratives of mar-
riages in which their husbands did not honor or respect those mar-
riages deserve to be heard, the economic disparities between divorced
spouses demand greater attention. 161 A husband's infidelity does not
necessarily leave a woman without a viable means of support upon
divorce; a court's refusal to make a fair settlement due to subjective
moral or cultural fault grounds does leave a woman without such
means of support. Furthermore, fault-based proposals suggesting that
a husband's infidelity will lead to a larger settlement for an innocent
wife are not reflected in the language of the Louisiana Act. 162
Instead of re-introducing fault into divorce proceedings, other
divorce reform models emphasize the economic results of divorce and
do not merely focus on the language of equality or moral behavior in
divorce law.' 63
 Fineman argues that although the passage of many
154 See Rhode & Minow, supra note 10, at 195-97.
155 See Starnes, supra note 145, at 70.
156 See Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 41, at 1110.
157 See id.
158 See Rhode & Minow, supra note 10, at 193.
1511 See id.
16° See WErrzmAN, supra note 7.
M I suggest that women's narratives, and not men's, go unheard under a no-fault regime to
contrast the needs of divorcing women to air their stories and their need to receive financially
secure settlements. I am arguing that although those narratives are important, women's post-di-
vorce financial devastation demands greater attention—thus the focus on women here.
162 See LA. REV. STA•. ANN. §§ 272-275,307-309.
163 See Fineman, supra note 37; Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 41; Starnes, supra note 145.
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no-fault divorce laws led to equitable distribution statutes, the resulting
laws were merely facially equal and still create unequal results.'"
Scholar Jana Singer insists "that equal results for divorcing women
is (sic] an essential component of any equitable divorce regime."' 65
Thus, in the investment partnership model advanced by Singer—an in-
novative economic reform model that has roots in equitable distribu-
tion theories—each spouse is considered to have contributed equally
to the marriage regardless of whether the spouse worked inside or
outside the home.'" The emphasis in an economic settlement would
be on equal results, not on a rule of equal treatment.'" Such equal
results would rely less on judicial decisions about what constitutes a
moral or economic contribution to a marriage and more on an estab-
lished system for sharing income, much like the valuation tables used
in child custody cases.' 68 One way to achieve such equal results, Singer
argues, is through the investment partnership model which requires a
post-divorce sharing of income.' Based on their tax returns, a couple
would share their income equally for a determined amount of time
regardless of fault or individual blame and separate from child sup-
port.'" Judicial discretion regarding spousal support—a dangerous
and risky ingredient to divorce proceedings—would be minimized.' 71
The investment-partnership model would have several advantages.
First, it addresses gender-linked marital work and investment deci-
sions.' 72 Each spouse's work contributions arc given equal weight) 73
Second, it identifies marriage as an economic relationship to which
parties bring different skills and resources but equal participation."'
Third, the post-divorce income-sharing model provides financial assis-
tance at the most necessary time--immediately after divorce)" Fourth,
this model limits judicial discretion by providing clear-cut guidelines.'"
Finally, it is relatively easy to administer this model using a couple's
i" See Fineman, supra note 37, at 3-5.
161 Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 41, at 1114,
1 611
 See id,
lo See id.
1118
 See id. at 1117-21.
1144 See id.
17° See Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 41, at 1117,1120.
171
 See id. at 1119-20.
172 See id, at 1118.
I" See id.
"4 See id.
175 See Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 41, at 1119.
176 See id.
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federal tax returns.'? The investment-partnership model requires in-
come sharing by the couple for a fixed number of years.'"
Economic reforms of the no-fault system have the added benefit
of having immediate practical effect.'" The continued application by
sexist court systems of facially neutral laws would be reduced sig-
nificantly.'" Once an economic system is in place, reformers could
address institutionalized sexism in the courts with less immediate finan-
cial urgency for women currently undergoing divorce."'
Moreover, mechanisms already exist for redressing fault harms
within a marriage. 182 With the widespread demise of interspousal im-
munity in tort cases, tort actions have become a means for redress-
ing past "faults" in the marriage.'" Generally, the two tort actions
arising out of a marriage or divorce are battery and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.' 84 In lieu of receiving damages through a
separate tort action, an aggrieved spouse may use the threat of such a
lawsuit to negotiate a stronger economic divorce settlement than he
or she may have received.'" Indeed, tort actions seem to serve a
leveraging function similar to fault in the fault regime—requiring
damages based on the tort liability or using tort as a bargaining chip
for a better settlement for the aggrieved party.'" By relying on estab-
lished tort law in actions in which plaintiffs and defendants are neces-
sarily of the opposite sex, perhaps courts can avoid sexist application
of fault laws."7
VI. IDEAS FOR FUTURE REFORM
Once result-oriented economic changes take effect, reformers can
begin to challenge the sexist notions that continue to divide labor by
gender and circumscribe marital behavior.'" One way to begin this task
177 See id. at 1120.
178 See id, at 1117.
179 See Starnes, supra note 145, at 71.
18° See Czapanskiy, supra note 6; see also Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 41, at 1119.
181 See Starnes, supra note 145, at 71.
192 See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Paull in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773,
792-93 & n.41 (1996).
195 See id. at 792 & n.41.
194 See id. at 792-94.
185 See id.
186 See Woodhouse, supra note 6, at 2538-41.
187 See Milan, supra note 182, at 791.
199 See ARLIE 1-10CHSHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND TIIE REVOLUTION AT
IIOME (1989).
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is to reconceptualize marriage.' 89 The importance of marriage as the
legitimate site of childrearing has diminished in the past generation
with the rise of single-parent households and divorced families.'"" With
the rise of antenuptial agreements and the increased number of re-
marriages and step-families, the notion of marriage as the founda-
tion for the nuclear patriarchal family has decreased.' 9 ' Such new fami-
lies may re-negotiate child custody, living arrangements and property
rights.' 92 The rationale behind marriage as an exclusively heterosexual
means of rearing and educating children and transferring property
should be reconsidered. 19"
Legal options that would result in a necessary re-evaluation or
re-conceptualization of marriage include privileging the parent-child
over the husband-wife relationship as the fundamental legal and eco-
nomic building block of the family.'" Another legal option would be
to separate childrearing from marriage and to link child support and
education to parent-child relationships rather than to marital status.
Finally, another option would be to sanction different kinds of contrac-
tual relationships exclusive of heterosexual relationships. Marriage
could then become a more contractual relationship—open to many
possible manifestations that arc not inherently linked to sexual behav-
ior, sexual relationships or procreativity.' 95
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the moral rhetoric of fault-based divorce reform
serves to distract reformers from the economic inequality caused by
gender-neutral divorce laws in a gender-biased world. Fault-based di-
vorce laws and proposals do not necessarily allow for greater financial
protection for women and children. 19' By focusing on hard-to-define
notions of morality, fault-based reforms absolve the state of financial
responsibility for an often vulnerable and impoverished segment of
society—divorced mothers and their children. 197 Fault-based divorce
'!"' Se* tic R, Carbolic & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 Tut,. L. REV. 953 (1991).
199 See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND TIM NEW PROPERTY (1981).
191 See id
192 See id.
193 See id.; see also Carbone & Brinig, supra note 189, at 1010.
194 See Carbone & Brinig, supra note 189, at 1009.
195 See id at 1010.
196 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.	 272-275, 307-309 (West Stipp. 1998); Scott, supra note 16;
Woodhouse, supra note 6.
197 See Rhode & Minow, supra note 10, at 197.
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reforms are financially destructive to divorced mothers and their chil-
dren and ultimately hamper efforts to make necessary economic re-
forms to divorce law. Economic reforms must rest on guidelines de-
signed to result in equal financial outcomes for both men and women
after divorce to eradicate the post-divorce poverty that disproportion-
ately affects women and children.
JANE BIONDI
